Without a written certification letter, Drax did not have the power to guarantee anything to the Soviet Union and had been ordered by the British government to extend the talks as long as possible and avoid the question of whether Poland would agree to allow Soviet troops to enter the country if the Germans invaded the country.  When negotiations failed, a great opportunity to prevent German aggression was probably missed.  According to Dörr & Schmalenbach`s commentary on the Life Convention on Contract Law, “the fact that secret treaties do not play an essential role today is less the result of [Article 102 of the CHARTER of the United Nations] than of a general change in the governance of international relations.”  US President Woodrow Wilson was an opponent of secret diplomacy and saw it as a threat to peace. He made the abolition of secret diplomacy the first point of his Fourteen Points (set out in a speech to Congress on January 8, 1918, according to the United States. THAT`S HOW THEY GOT INTO THE WAR).  Wilson “distanced the United States from the Allies` previous secret engagements and tried to abolish them forever once the war was won.”  The Fourteen Points were based on a design paper written by Walter Lippmann and his colleagues Isaiah Bowman, Sidney Mezes and David Hunter Miller.  Lippmann`s project was a direct response to the secret contracts presented to Lippman by the Minister of War, Newton D. Baker.  Lippman`s mission was to “take the secret treaties, analyze the parts that were tolerable, separate them from those we consider unbearable, and then develop a position that recognized as much as possible to the Allies, but took the poison. Everything was aligned with the secret treaties. That`s what happened in the 14 points.  Secret contracts (in which the agreement itself is itself secret) are different from secret negotiations (for which the ongoing negotiations are confidential, but where the final agreement is public).
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