The Munich quotation in foreign policy debates is also common in the 21st century.  During negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal by Secretary of State John Kerry, a Republican representative from Texas called the negotiations “worse than Munich.” In a speech in France, Kerry himself referred to Munich for military action in Syria: “This is our munich moment.”  To resolve the crisis, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew to Hitler on 15 September at his private mountain retreat in Berchtesgaden. The excerpt presented comes from Chamberlain`s report on that first meeting with Hitler, as reported by the cabinet on 17 September. The Prime Minister said of the fuehrer: “He saw no signs of madness, but a lot of excitement.” He mentioned Hitler`s tendency to “go into a tirade.” Despite this, Chamberlain was apparently pleased that he had a positive impression on Hitler. The Munich Pact signed on 30 September allowed Germany to annex the Sudetenland. In March 1939, German troops recaptured the rest of Czechoslovakia. In May 1938, it was known that Hitler and his generals were drawing up a plan for the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakians needed military help from France, with which they had an alliance. The Soviet Union also had a treaty with Czechoslovakia, and it expressed its willingness to cooperate with France and Great Britain if it decided to come and defend Czechoslovakia, but the Soviet Union and its potential services were ignored throughout the crisis. As he did not want to sever his government`s relations with Western Europe, the heirs reluctantly agreed. The British appointed Lord Runciman, the former Liberal cabinet minister, who arrived in Prague on 3 August to convince Benes to accept an acceptable plan for the Sudeten Germans.  On 20 July, Bonnet informed the Czechoslovakian ambassador in Paris that France, while publicly declaring its support for the Czechoslovakian negotiations, was not prepared to go to war on the Sudetenland.
 In August, the German press was full of stories of Czechoslovakian atrocities against the Sudeten Germans, with the intention of forcing the West to put pressure on the Czechoslovakians to make concessions.  Hitler hoped that the Czechoslovaks would refuse and that the West would feel morally justified in abandoning the Czechoslovaks to their fate.  In August, Germany sent 750,000 troops along the border with Czechoslovakia, officially as part of military maneuvers.   On September 4 or 5, Erbe presented the fourth plan, which met almost all of the requirements of the agreement. The Sudeten Germans were invited by Hitler to the prairies to avoid compromise, and the SdP organized demonstrations which, on 7 September, provoked a police operation in Ostrava, during which two of its deputies were arrested.  The Sudeten Germans used the incident and the false allegations of other atrocities as a pretext to interrupt further negotiations.   In the United States and the United Kingdom, the words “Munich” and “appeasement” are synonymous with a call for frank, often military, measures to resolve an international crisis and to characterize a political adversary who condemns negotiations as a weakness. In 1950, U.S. President Harry Truman invoked “Munich” to justify his military action in the Korean War: “The world has learned from Munich that security cannot be bought by appeasement.”  Many subsequent crises were accompanied by “Munchner” cries from politicians and the media.